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Technological change engages our attention. I suspect that even 
those who believe themselves to be essentially ignorant about 
technology - and perhaps not very interested in it - nevertheless 
experience,. from time to time, a sense of wonder at the 
extraordinary things which new technologies are able to do. 
Perhaps we are as bewitched by technology, and nearly as 
convinced of its omnipotence as were the Europeans of the last 
years of the nineteenth century. 
Economists do not escape from this. In the last ten years or so 
they have shown a greatly increased interest in the economic 
effects of technological change. In doing so they have been 
prolific in the creation of new theoretical structures - about 
economic growth for example, or about the factors that 
determine the directions of trade - in which technological factors 
playa central role. These theories are not always as new as their 
authors seem to imagine, but that does not really matter. It is 
much more interesting that the putatively new approaches to 
technology they include are, to all appearances, enthusiastically 
discussed in a discipline, which shares at least one feature with 
the great theologies - namely a deep reluctance to contemplate 
any changes in its basic assumptions. I would guess that the 
reason for this new found openness, is that the actual experience 
of technological change in reality presents us with important 
challenges which the older restrictive theories are not very good 
at explaining. 
But it is not my purpose to discuss how economic theory is 
trying to cope with the facts of technological change. I will leave 
that for another occasion. Instead - as the title of my lecture 
indicates - I will discuss the role which technological change 
appears to play in the industrial competitiveness of developing 
countries. I will not theorise about this - at least not in any 
comprehensive way - though the facts which I shall present 
certainly seem to need some new theory. I would prefer to 
concern myself with a question which is of very practical 
concern in developing countries, namely, is technology 
important for the international competitiveness of developing 
countries - especially in the industrial sectors? 
There are two rather obvious reasons for suspecting that it might 
be very important. First, the world economy is now much more 
open than it was two decades ago. Most countries have opened 
their markets to international competition. Industrial firms have 
to be competitive - not just in order to be successful in export 
markets, but increasingly also to survive in their own home 
markets. This alone should lead us to expect that the effects of 
new production methods and new products will be more rapidly 
and deeply felt throughout the developing world than in the old 
days of protected markets and there is a good deal of evidence 
that this is indeed the case. 
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The second reason is that technological change seems not only 
to have accelerated, but to have diffused through a much wider 
range of industrial sectors than before. It used to be sensible to 
describe the traditional sectors of early industrialisation - food 
and beverages, textiles, garments, wood products and the like -
as technologically stagnant or at least very slow moving. But 
new technologies have changed that. These traditional sectors 
are increasingly influenced by automated control, CAD/CAM 
systems, and new materials. They are no longer Cinderella 
sectors of slow technological change. This is presumably 
important for developing countries. There was a time when the 
internationally slow rate of technological change in these sectors 
seemed to make them partiCUlarly appropriate for countries 
which had a weak technological capability. Today the supposed 
advantage of a slow rate of technological change is no longer so 
evident. 
Both these observations suggest that technological change must 
surely be a critical concern in industries in developing countries, 
and that we might as well take our question as answered and 
look for something more interesting to discuss. However, I wish 
to argue that there is still a lot to discuss and that the role of 
technological change in competitiveness is less obvious than 
these simple (and partially correct) arguments suggest. 
To show this I will summarise some of the ideas we have been 
worldng on at Maastricht. First I will explore relations between 
competitiveness and technological change through some 
intercountry comparisons. This will lead to the notion that there 
are different paths to industrial competitiveness, not all of which 
involve a commitment to rapid technological change. Second I 
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will discuss the differences between these paths, focusing· 
especially on employment and income distribution. Then finally 
I will make some points about policy. Please note that I have 
chosen my words carefully on this last point. I cannot promise in 
one short lecture to say anything definitive about policy. I will 
however try to make a few observations about the problems that 
need to be addressed. 
The research on which I shall draw was based on data on 118 
developing countries drawn from the IBRD World Tables. We 
used this data source to measure the competitiveness of these 
countries in international industrial markets and also to measure 
technological change. We measured competitiveness by the 
growth of manufactured exports over the 20 years from 1970 to 
1990. We distinguished countries which showed a sustained 
growth of industrial exports over that period 1, from those 
countries in which industrial exports were either stagnant or very 
erratic - and we measured the compound growth rates of 
manufactured exports in the usual way. Similarly we calculated 
the growth of value added per worker (or labour productivity) in 
the manufacturing sector as a measure of technological change 
and distinguished countries which show sustained growth of 
value added per worker from those that don't. Both these 
measures can be questioned, but arguably both are defensible. 
I To do this we calculated the usual regression of time on the logarithm of a 
constant price series of manufactured exports. We defmed those countries for 
which the regression is significant at the one per cent level as showing 
'significant and sustained' growth in manufactured exports. 
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Industrial Competitiveness and Technological Change. 
We will start the story with the data on export growth. These 
showed that in the period from 1970 to 1990, 37 developing 
countries qut of the 118 for which there was data, showed a 
sustained growth in manufactured exports. The growth rates for 
exports ranged from about 4 per cent per annum, to quite 
remarkable rates of more than 20 percent per annum. The 
highest rates were in Mauritius (26 percent per annum), 
Indonesia (25 percent) and Sri Lanka (22 percent). These are 
historically. unprecedented growth rates for manufactured' 
exports for such a long period. The NICs also had high rates 
(South Korean manufactured exports grew at over 18 percent per 
annum in this period), and the second tier NIC's - Indonesia, 
Malaysia and Thailand - had export growth rates at or above 20 
percent. China and India also successfully entered world 
industrial markets, with high rates of export growth. 
The question next addressed was: how far are these country 
performances in exporting manufactured goods related to 
technological factors as measured by the rate of growth of value 
added per worker in the various manufacturing sectors? 
Table 1 shows the situation. For the moment ignore the 
breakdown of the data in the Table between two groups of 
countries. There are 24 countries for which there is full data -
that is data on both manufactured exports and value-added per 
worker in manufacturing - over this period. So 13 out of the 37 
countries which showed significant growth of manufactured 
exports are not included. The growth rates of productivity in the 
manufacturing sectors have varied from less than zero (in 
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Mauritius and Sri Lanka for example) to rates around 5 percent 
or more (in China, Indonesia and Korea). Some of the high 
export growth countries have not had significant productivity 
growth at all - and in the large group of 81 countries which have 
not entered manufactured export trade to any marked extent, 
there are none which show significant growth of productivity in 
manufacturing. 
Even a casual look at the data in the table suggests that there is 
no simple relation to be found between our measures of export 
competitiveness and of technological change. 
This is not altogether surprising. Even within the manufacturing 
sector, international competitiveness may be based on various 
conditions: for example, on abundant labour and consequent low 
real wages, or on the availability of cheap natural resources. 
These conditions are plainly reflected in the export growth data. 
Sri Lanka and Mauritius - and to some extent Malaysia too -
exported low wage labour intensive goods. The Latin American 
manufacturing export economies have been specialising in 
resource based industrial exports since they opened up to world 
trade in, the 1980's. Competitiveness on these terms does not 
have much to do with teclmological change. 
Nevertheless, it would be mistaken to allow the lack of a linear 
relationship in these data, to obscure the role of technological 
factors in the trade pattern. In the first place, some of the 
countries listed in the Table have shown remarkable 
technological performances. Growth of labour productivity over 
20 years at rates of 4 to 5 percent is extraordinary and it would 
not be sensible to ignore the implications that may have had for 
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the development of manufactured exports. One simple way of 
ordering the data is simply to split the group of countries into a 
sub-group with high productivity growth and a sub-group with 
low productivity growth. I have done this in the Table, and I 
chose - arbitrarily - to make the dividing line at a productivity 
growth rate of 2 percent. This gives us the division into Groups 
IA and IB in the Table. In fact most of the 13 countries for 
which we do not have full data, probablY also belong in the 
Group lB. We can think of the Group IB as including countries 
which have in the main pursued trade patterns based on their 
traditional sources of static comparative advantage, whilst the 
countries in Group IA have focused far more on capturing 
sources of dynamic comparative advantage. 
I 
From case studies we know that the high productivity growth 
pattern in the Group Ia countries arises from two sources: first, 
from relatively high rates of productivity growth in all sectors 
even in the so called traditional ones (like textiles or garments 
for example) and second, shifts in production from traditional, 
lower productivity sectors to sectors where the rates of 
technological change are inherently higher in all countries -
especially the electrical and non-electrical machinery sectors and 
the production of electronic consumer goods. These sectors are 
sometimes described as sectors where the rate of technological 
learning tends to be higher than elsewhere2• It is becoming quite 
fashionable to describe these two ways of accelerating 
technological change, as technological upgrading. 
2 Technically described as sectors with a high elasticity of learning. 
7 
Technological upgrading is just a way of describing the process 
by which a number of countries have moved from an initial 
concentration on labour intensive manufacturing exports to 
higher productivity and higher value added forms of 
manufacturing production. It is important to remember that 
countries which have upgraded have all started from an initial 
successful export trade in labour intensive low technology 
goods. So what the data tell us is that some countries - Group IA 
- have upgraded technologically over the period, and others have 
not (Group IB). Both groups have had high export growth rates. 
The question which I would like to consider now is: what 
difference does it make from a developmental point of view 
whether countries expand manufactured exports simply by 
sticking to their traditional sources of static comparative 
advantage, or whether they exploit possibilities of dynamic 
comparative advantage? Is technological upgrading a good 
thing? 
Before addressing that directly, I would like as a preliminary to 
note that the evidence about "technological upgrading" does not 
easily fit some of our more venerable assumptions in 
development economics. One respectable and much quoted 
source of such assumptions is the Fei and Ranis development of 
the Lewis dual economy model which Ranis has recently 
reworked. The Fei and Ranis predictions are sensible enough. 
They anticipate a first phase of industrial exports of a highly 
labour intensive kind which will switch the economy away from 
its traditional primary export pattern. This "export substitution" 
process results in very rapid industrial expansion. Later, at what 
these authors call the 'commercialisation point' where the labour 
surplus of the dual economy is fully absorbed, they predict a 
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process of technological upgrading (though they do not use that 
term). So for Fei and Ranis, technological upgrading is driven 
by the labour market. When industrial labour becomes scarce, 
there will be a move towards higher productivity technologies. 
This I suspect is the position most of us take. 
The argument does not really work. In practice countries which 
have upgraded - Korea, Taiwan, Indonesia, Thailand, India and 
China - all seem to have entered periods of accelerated 
technological change and increasing labour productivity, much 
earlier in the growth path, whilst there was still substantial 
surplus labour in the economy. I do not have time to argue 
through this question. I merely note it - and suggest that the 
answer may be found in some other features of the labour 
market - namely in the availability of quite large supplies of low 
cost sldlled labour in these countries. 
Let me turn now to the implications of the different growth 
paths from a development point of view in other words, back to 
the question: is technological upgrading a good thing? 
Real Wage Growth and Employment Growth. 
As far as the developmental impacts of the different types of 
growth path are concerned, an obvious place to start is with their 
effects on employment: obvious, because one of the points that 
is frequently made about technology and export development in 
developing countries is that there is a contradiction between the 
use of high technology in the interests of increasing the 
competitiveness of manufactured exports on the one hand and 
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the need to create employment and reduce underemployment on 
the other. How important has this been as far as the 'technology 
up graders ' are concerned. 
The answer must be: probably not very. The high productivity 
growth economies have had very high rates of manufactured 
exports and the effects of this expanding export demand have 
outweighed the productivity effects of technology upgrading - at 
least in the last twenty years. The point is clear from the data 
which we showed in Table 1, where the top ten economies from 
the standpoint of manufacturing productivity growth had an 
average rate of productivity growth of 3.6 percent and an 
average rate of growth of exports of 13 percent. The export 
growth rates which have been attained have much outweighed 
the effects of productivity growth on employment in these 
economies. 
Chart 1 shows the relationship between manufacturing 
employment growth and export growth in the high export 
economies. The 'adjusted R-squared' for the relationship 
between employment and exports is above 0.7, which is very 
high for, this kind of data. And the more important point is that 
the regression is not improved at all by the inclusion of the rate 
of growth of labour productivity as an explanatory variable. The 
effect of export growth is dominant. One could, of course, argue 
that the rate of growth of employment in the high productivity 
economies would have been higher other things being equal if 
they had done less technological upgrading. But thal is a risky 
kind of argument, since we don't lmow whether. other things -
especially export growth - would have been equal. All one can 
say is that the low productivity growth economies got a larger 
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amount of employment out of each unit of manufacturing export 
value, than did the high productivity ones - but that Canrlot be a 
basis for any kind of policy conclusion. 
In short, b,oth the high productivity and the low productivity 
economies gained from a distributional point of view from 
export growth, because of its strong effects in generating 
manufacturing employment. Productivity growth in the high 
productivity economies, though very large by any reasonable 
standards, nevertheless did not undermine employment growth 
there. It is interesting that amongst the economies which have 
successfully mopped up surplus labour in the past two decades, 
there have been some (Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and other 
NICs, which have had very high productivity growth, as well as 
some more 'traditional' low productivity, labour intensive 
exporters. Will export demand remain buoyant enough to sustain 
this state of affairs in the future? I simply don't lmow, and I 
doubt that anyone does. 
The distribution of welfare is also importantly influenced by the 
real wage, through what is called the functional distribution of 
income - that is the distribution of manufacturing value added 
between wages and profits. Are there important differences from 
this point of view, between countries that upgrade and countries 
that do not? 
Table 2 shows the data on the growth of real earnings per worker 
in the high export economies, once again divided between the 
high and low productivity growth paths. There are some striking 
points in the data. 
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First, the high productivity growth economies, (with the 
exception of Mexico) have had sustained groWth in real earnings 
per worker. The asterisks indicate that the coefficients are 
statistically significant at one percent. Moreover, with a couple 
of exceptions, the growth of real earnings has been high over the 
period. 
Second, for the low productivity group the picture is less happy. 
Generally the growth rate of real earnings has been much lower 
than in the high productivity group - as indeed one would 
expect. In particular, over this 20 year period real earnings in 
some of the highly labour intensive high export growth 
countries, have actually declined in some cases and remained 
effectively constant in others. Competitiveness may sometimes 
be necessary for economic development, but these data leave 
one with a suspicion that - as Paul Krugman has recently 
observed - it might not be sufficient. 
The point is taken further in Chart 2, which plots the rates of 
growth of real earnings per worker against the rate of growth of 
value added per worker. There is a discernible and statistically 
signific~t relationship as one would expect. To be a bit formal 
about it, the adjusted R-squared for this relationship is 0:55 and 
the test statistics for the regression coefficient show it is 
significant at the one percent. I am well aware that there are too 
few data points for comfort, but nevertheless - given the plot in 
Chart 2 - it is unlikely to be a spurious relationship. Low 
productivity growth economies have low real wage growth. 
The regression also suggests that on the average for this group of 
high export economies, the rate of growth of value added per 
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worker has not been much different from the rate of growth of 
real earnings per worker. This means that the share of profits and 
the share of wages in the division of value added (that is the 
functional· distribution of income), has remained roughly 
constant in, the group as a whole. The share of labour in value 
added is important from the point of view of income distribution 
across the manufacturing sector. Also, in a market economy the 
incentive for firms to invest depends on maintaining profit 
levels. From this standpoint the situation in the high productivity 
economies is more favourable from that in the low productivity 
ones. In the foimer, profits share may be kept high without too 
much pressure on wages, because value added per worker is 
growing fast.. In the low productivity economies, where 
competitiveness has depended importantly on keeping real 
earnings per worker down, maintaining profits share (or 
increasing it in order to avoid a fall in levels of profitability as 
value added per worker has fallen) requires more stringent 
sacrifices in terms of real wage growth. The battle for income 
shares is all the more intense in these circumstances. 
What can be said about developmental implications of high and 
low productivity export growth paths ? I think there are three 
points to be made. Two are conclusions from what has just been 
said; the third is a qualification. 
First, over the past twenty years or so, both types of growth path 
have had strongly positive implications through their effects on 
income growth and especially employment growth. Indeed, the 
mopping up of surplus labour has depended first and foremost 
on taking advantage of export markets for manufactures - at least 
in a number of important countries. The underlying point is that 
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the income elasticity of demand for manufactured goods is 
generally higher than for primary outputs, and developing 
countries which shift to manufactured exports - even low 
productivity ones - benefit directly from this. 
Second, the high productivity path has distributional advantages 
over the low productivity path, because of its generally 
favourable implications for the development of the real wage. 
This does not guarantee a more equitable functional distribution . 
of income, but - as the data show - it makes it more likely. 
Furthermore, it might be argued that the high productivity path 
opens the way to a type of virtuous circle, which is to some 
extent observable (at least in some sub-periods): since a high 
rate of wage increase has been associated with a high rate of 
labour productivity increase, profits have grown at more or less 
the same rate. This has positive incentive effects on industrial 
investment - which in turn probably stimulates the incorporation 
of further technological advances. 
Third, the qualification: income distribution is not mechanically 
fixed by labour markets and productivity. It also depends on 
institutiqnal factors. A good example of this is the effect of the 
different growth paths - high and low productivity -on the 
gender division of labour. There is actually very little known 
about this, which is one reason why we have engaged on a large 
project - with the support of UNIFEM - on technological 
change and women's employment. Evidently the impacts of 
technological change on women's employment are likely to be 
importantly mediated by labour market conditions - especially 
whether there is a structural labour surplus in the economy or 
not. But we might also expect that they will be influenced by the 
, 
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nature of the technological growth path associated with the 
development of manufactured exports. I would like to illustrate 
tIns by three examples, willch draw heavily on the work of my 
colleague Prof. Swasti Mitter. 
In the fIrst place, in labour surplus econonries willch follow a 
path of labour intensive (low productivity growth) exports, 
competitiveness in the face of international technological 
change, as we have seen, may require cost cutting by methods 
other than improved technological efficiency. Tills usually 
means a fall in real wages. There is substantial evidence -
mainly from export zones - that the employment of women 
workers is used as a way of achieving such reductions. Tills is 
noticeable in particular sectors - like garments - where cost 
cutting can take the form of SUbstituting less well organised 
female labour for male labour. The positive distributional effects 
of increasing employment through exports may be offset by such 
considerations. 
Second, special problems can arise in the transition out of the 
low productivity pattern. Technological upgrading to illgher 
levels of labour productivity - which as we have seen may 
happen in the context of labour surplus - has resulted in cases 
where women workers are replaced by men. The gender 
distribution of income is then affected. For example, Mitter 
quotes Narayan and Rajah who show that technological 
upgraditlg in the electronics industry in Malaysia resulted in a 
fall in the proportion of women in the workforce from 80 per 
cent in the low technology phase, to 67 per cent after production 
had been 'computerised. She also notes deterioration in 
conditions and nature of women's work. So the positive real 
§G'OFSOG'?~) ~.~ 15 ~ ~ OJ :I.'< ..... 
wage effects of upgrading may be offset to' some degree by 
negative distributional effects due to changing gender patterns of 
employment. 
Thirdly, with more complete transitions to a higher productivity 
growth path in the industrial sector, other factors become 
important in determining the scale and nature of women's 
employment. The higher productivity technologies may open up 
the prospect of more slalled employment which underlines the' 
importance of prior training. And, as Mitter shows, the transition 
is usually accompanied by an accelerated growth of the service 
sector. This has opened up new opportunities for women's 
employment which should be more equalising. 
So - in general - the distributional effects of the different growth 
paths are more complex than our observations on the functional 
distribution of income suggest, though those observations are 
probably a helpful point of departure. 
A Synopsis and Some Points for Policy. 
How are we to bring all this together and relate to matters of 
policy? 
The key point in the discussion has been the idea of alternative 
technological paths to competitiveness in manufactured exports -
the high productivity growth path and the low. This is an 
extreme dichotomy, since countries do not necessarily belong 
wholly to one category or the other and since there are always 
some in transition. For example, Malaysia is now plainly 
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shifting from a low productivity path to a high as surplus and 
immigrant labour is absorbed. It is nevertheless helpful 
heuristically to think in terms of a dichotomy. 
There are interesting similarities in the patterns we have 
observed empirically and some of the theoretical results which 
Krugman and others have developed on technology and trade. 
Those results suggest that technological learning processes 
linked to production may in some circumstances produce a 'lock 
in' to a pattern of comparative advantage. Countries may get 
stuck on relatively low productivity growth paths. They also 
suggest that selective policy interventions - the so-called 
'narrow moving band' of subsidy and export promotion - may 
brealc out of the 'lock in' and generate increasing shares in 
markets for manufacture exports. Both phenomena - the lock in 
and the transition - appear to be present in the group of 
countries we have discussed. 
Although the question is not discussed in precisely these terms 
there is a great deal of concern amongst policy makers in various 
parts of the world with the risks of becoming locked in to a 
pattern of static comparative advantage and with the advantages 
of fmding ways to make the transition - in other words to 
achieve technological upgrading. The concern with structural 
transformation of industry in the ECLAC for example stems 
directly from worries about the adequacy of an industrial export 
pattern based heavily on resource based industries, for the long 
run growth of income. In an open world economy, where there 
are strong short run pressures towards static comparative 
advantage, such worries are bound to be more and more 
expressed. In effect this means that many of the old questions of 
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static versus dynamic comparative advantage, will come back on 
to the agenda. And if this is right, there will be a real concern 
with the question of how to make the transition from low 
productivity growth paths to high. 
It would be disproportionately ambitious to try and answer that 
question in the short time available - and I won't. Instead, I will 
sketch some of the points that a proper answer will have to 
encompass in this concluding part of the lecture. 
I will briefly address two issues. First I will discuss the role of 
the labour intensive phase of manufactured export development. 
Then, second, after a brief statement of the advantages of the 
high technology path, I will touch briefly on some economic 
aspects of the transition from one path to the other, as well as on 
the risks that might be involved. 
To start with: the low productivity path. The low productivity 
growth, labour intensive phase of manufactured export 
development is especially important for- the large majority of 
developing countries which have yet to develop a sustained 
growth pf manufactured exports. I would like to suggest that the 
importance of this phase of manufactured export development is 
overlooked in a lot of current debate. The desire to fmd some 
general formula which will allow countries to emulate the NICs 
by making the transition to the high technology path has 
obscured important considerations. It has, in particular, 
obscured the problems facing countries which are new entrants 
to world trade in manufacturing. The low technology growth 
path to competitiveness is important for those countries - and to 
others which are at an early stage of industrial exports. I suggest, 
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more generally, that the low technology path is important for the 
following reasons. 
First, because all countries in the high productivity group have 
gone through it - and indeed economic history would show that 
the presently industrialised countries followed a similar route. 
This is so obviously relevant and important for that large 
majority of developing countries which have yet to enter world 
trade in manufactures, that it needs no further comment. They 
can only enter trade in manufactures by the low productivity 
route. 
Second, the low productivity phase is not necessarily a phase of 
technological stagnation. The history of Korean export 
development has shown that. So, for example, Prof Y oungil Lim 
- a recent visitor to the ISS as to INTECH in Maastricht - has 
given us data to show that in the first ten years of Korean export 
development from 1960, the number of products being produced 
for export markets expanded from about 200 to nearly 3000. 
This is product innovation on a major scale in 'low technology' 
sectors. Other authors have shown how important technological 
learning in the low productivity simple sectors was in the 
Korean and Taiwan development. And evidence from other 
NICs would reinforce the point. It is obviously simplest to start 
the search for dynamism in the pattern of comparative 
advantage, in lines of production at which the country is already 
capable. As a strategy, it is a good deal less risky than jumping 
to sectors where the country has had very little experience. 
Not all countries have followed dynamic strategies in the low 
productivity sectors. For example, Sri Lanka and Mauritius have 
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stuck to their 'static comparative advantage' sectors for many 
years, but have not accumulated much technological capability 
or generated productivity growth in them. But other countries 
have focused on learning in the simple sectors to good effect. 
Indonesia seems to be a good example .. 
Third, low productivity and high productivity growth paths are 
not alternatives. They are importantly complementary. This may 
be argued as follows. The learning processes which are central 
to technological upgrading depend on the growth of production 
in the high productivity sectors and lines of production. In turn 
the growth of production depends on investment. Now in most 
of the economies which are under discussion here, investment in 
the high productivity sectors is highly dependent on imported 
capital goods. For example Pack and Westphal have shown the 
great importance of imported plant and equipment in the 
learning processes in Korean high productivity sectors. But 
imports of ·capital goods depend on exports. The low 
productivity exports of countries like Korea, Taiwan and the 
second tier NICs have played a key role in supporting the 
investments on which high productivity growth depends. This 
intersectoral dependency - especially important in smaller open 
economies (but also relevant in larger ones with technologically 
backward capital goods sectors) is overlooked in most of the 
literature. Elsewhere I have shown that an optimal path of 
accumulation in the context of technological learning, will 
nearly always depend on an initial development of low 
productivity manufactured exports in exchange for imported 
capital goods. 
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Fourth, technological upgrading is risky. It may fail. It is widely 
agreed, for example, that the Korean 'heavy industry strategy' of 
the 1970's failed seriously. It was just such a high risk effort at 
upgrading. It did not come off. In such a situation, low 
productivity exports are an important way of hedging risks. 
They played that role in the Korean case, and after the collapse 
of the heavy industry strategy the continuance of low 
productivity exports helped to finance the capital goods imports 
for the much more successful upgrading to light electrical 
machinery production, electronics and automobiles. 
Finally, and most obviously, low productivity exports are an 
important way of absorbing surplus labour - especially relatively 
unskilled labour. They may be more important in the future if 
international demand for developing country exports grows less 
rapidly than in the past. 
F or all the importance of the low productivity phase, there is a 
legitimate concern with technological upgrading. It has many 
advantages. It is necessary in the long run anyway, because once 
labour markets tighten, and real wages rise, survival in an open 
world economy will require it . And more immediately, it is a 
way in which countries which have already started 
manufacturing exports can meet competition from below, as 
more low wage producers seek to enter the market. There is in 
fact a collective interest at work. It is in the interest of newcomer 
low productivity exporters that the countries ahead of them 
should upgrade, so as to leave the low wage end of the market 
for manufactures free for new entry. Upgrading moves countries 
into export markets where the income elasticity of world 
demand is higher, and so helps to maintain export growth -
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especially when real wages are rising. And fmally, in a dynamic 
world of technological change, the low productivity growth path 
may only be sustainable if real wages actually fall. 
There is a substantial and growing literature on how upgrading 
has taken place and on the role of gove111.Il?-ent in inducing it. 
Pack and Westphal have written convincingly of the Korean 
case; Dahlmann on Taiwan and Korea; Wade has discussed the 
role of the state in both countries. I do not intend to repeat their 
fmdings here, nor to enter the debate on the role of the state. 
Instead, I will conclude with two observations about the nature 
of the upgrading process. One of these is an analytic economic 
point. The other is about institutional preconditions. 
The economic point is missed in much of the current discussion. 
It is simply that the process of technological upgrading has 
much in common with the process of investment, and needs to 
be thought about in much the same way as we think about . 
investment. What do I mean by this? Let me try to explain. 
The point is that technological upgrading usually involves a shift 
of resomces from sectors in which a country already has a short 
run comparative advantage, to sectors or lines of production 
where it is presently not competitive, but where - with a bit of 
luck and a lot of technological learning - it is anticipated that it 
will become competitive in a reasonably short period of time. It 
is an infant industry idea. Like all such, it involves a short run 
cost as resources are diverted from more productive (less 
sophisticated) sectors to sectors which are currently less 
productive. The justification for this shift must be that the 
eventually, with enough accumulation of technological 
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capability, the new upgraded sectors will in turn become the 
more productive ones. There is a short run sacrifice of incomes, 
in the interests of a long run gain. This is the analogy to 
investment. And it means that upgrading needs to be approached 
in much the same way as investment. For example, it may not be 
possible for very low income countries to do much upgrading, 
simply because present income necessarily has a high relative 
importance in the situation of poverty. The future is discounted 
at a high rate. 
Second, and this will be my final remark, it is quite clear that 
there are important, rather tough preconditions for successful 
policies of technological upgrading. Like all learning processes, 
technological upgrading depends on the capacity to learn, which 
in turn and rather paradoxically depends on what has been 
learned in the past. This is one of the few points on which all 
sides of the debate about technology and competitiveness are 
agreed. The success of the NICs and of new entrant countries 
like China and India, was importantly mediated by prior 
industrial experience, which was very considerable in Korea of 
the 1960's and is equally so in India and China of today. It is 
also mediated by a large supply of well educated managers, 
workers and bureaucrats. And the wider development of the 
technological infrastructure of countries - what is nowadays 
called the national system of innovation - is also critical. We 
know surprisingly little about these preconditions for the 
generation of technological capability and there is a lot of 
research to do. 
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TABLE 1: HIGH EXPORT GROWTH ECONOMIES 
G ro w th 0 f Man u fa c tu re d Ex ports and 
Value Added per Worker 1970-1990 
Country Export Growth 
1970-91 
VA per Worker 
Growth 1970-90 
IA Countries with high value added growth per worker 
Korea 18.44 * 5.71 * 
Chin a 9.9 >I< 4.5 * 
Indonesia 25.49 * 4.49 * 
Pakistan 4.39 * 4.19 >I< 
U raguay 7.69 * 3.88 * 
Thailand 21.15 * 3.09 * 
Mexico 10.4 6 * 2.96 >I< 
Singapore 16.38 >I< 2.58 >I< 
Barbados 10.54 >I< 2.2 * 
India 5.62 * 2.12 * 
AVERAGE 13.01 3.57 
lB. Countries with low value added growth per worker 
Turkey 20.32 * 1.93 * 
Malaysia 17.54 >I< 1.71 * 
Chile 7.4 * 1.46 >I< 
Brazil 15.09 * 1.09 * 
Peru 13.4 9 * 0.17 
V en e~uela 10.21 >I< -0.63 
Fiji 9.06 * -0.79 
Philippines 16.61 >I< -0.87 
P an am a 9.14 * -0.9 * 
Morocco 13.25 >I< -1.54 
Sri Lanka 22.42 >I< -2.23 
Tonga 13.51 >I< -3.3 
Mauritius 26.21 * -3.77 * 
Trinidad 4.52 * -3.87 * 
AVERAGE 14.19 -0.82 
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TABLE 2:HIGH EXPORT GROWTH ECONOMIES 
Growth of Value Added per Worker and 
of Real Earnings 1970-1990 
Country Prod uctivity Earnings 
Growth Growth 
Countries with high value added per worker growth 
Korea 5.71 * 6.91 * 
China 4.5 * 3.66 * 
Indonesia 4.49 * 5.91 * 
Pakistan 4.19 * 4.22 * 
Uruguay 3.88 * 0.88 
Thailand 3.09 * 1. 75 * 
Mexico 2.96 * -0.84 * 
Singapore 2.58 * 3.74 * 
Barbados 2.2 * 0.88 * 
India 2.12 * 1.41 * 
Countries with low value added per worker growth 
Turkey 1.93 * 2.17 * 
Malaysia 1. 71 * 2.08 * 
Chile 1.46 * 5.86 * 
Brazil 1.09 * 4.26 * 
Peru 0.17 -1.63 
Venezuela -0.63 1.87 
Fiji -0.79 0.53 
Philippines -0.87 -1.37 
Panama -0.9 * 0.6 * 
Morocco -1.54 -1.19 * 
Sri Lanka -2.23 -0.33 
Tonga -3.3 -3.76 
Mauritius . -3.77 * -0.13 
Trinidad -3.87 * 2.06 
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